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COMMENTARY 
Pay equity, the ''free"market and state 
intervention 
Rosemary Du Plessis No vi tz* and N abila J a bert 
A number of publications opposing pay equity published by the Business Round 
Table, the Employers' Federation and the Centre for Independent Studit!.s between 
1988 and 1990 have opposed pay equity. The id~as in these publications are shared 
by many neo-classical economists who advocate the operation of a "free" labour 
market with nzinin1al intervention b_v the State or unions. These argunit!.nts are 
currently being used to justify the repeal of pay equity legislation. This article 
provides an empirical evaluation of claims thiJt a deregulated labour nzarket will be 
to the advantage of u fo men workers and that pay equity policies benefit only the most 
skilled women in paid work. It den1onstrates that state intervention .in the labour 
market and the unionisation of won1en in employment are associated with 
reductions in the earnings gap between women and men. 
1. Introduction 
A National Government has just been elected which is commiued to the repeal of 
New Zcaland·s pay equity legislation. In this context it is vital that advocates of pay 
equity critically evaluate the arguments which have been advanced against it by the 
proponents of a "free" market in labour. This paper examines the v1cw that pay C{!uity 
disrupts the operation of the "free" market, ha~ discmploymcnt effccL'\ and cannot deliver 
equality for women in workplaces. Penelope Brook, among others, has recently argued 
that, while pay equity policies benefit those women \vith skill and qualifications, it 
works against the interc ts of tho e who are most vulnerable in the workforce (Brook, 
1990). Our interest is in an empirical evaluation of these claims. 
The findings of empirical research show that women's earnings are closer to those of 
men in countries in which there is son1c measure of state intervention in the labour 
market and where a high proportion of women arc members of nationally and regionally 
organised unions. We demonstrate that less skilled women with relatively low pay have 
benefited from pay equity policies in other countries and that these moves do not 
inevitably have disemploymcnt effects. Issues surrounding job evaluation schcn1es used 
in pay equity a~sessmcnts arc reviewed. The paper concludes that pay equity is only one 
of a number of policies necessary for en1ployn1ent equity for women and that it should be 
exam incd in fclation to a range of other strategies. 
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2. Pay equity the "free market" and state intervention 
Women in New Zealand earn on average 81 percent of male hourly ordinary time 
earnings (Research Advisory Group, 1990, p.85). This is largely the outcome of their 
concentration in a narrow range of occupations which have traditionally been dominated 
by women workers (Research Advisory Group, 1990, pp.87-92). These occupations have 
often been associated with lower rates of pay than jobs in which men are concentrated. 
Arguments for pay equity are based on the view that these lower rates of pay are a 
consequence of a history of gender discrimination in the labour market (Treiman and 
Hartmann, 1981; Wilson, 1988; Kim, 1989). Women in the past experienced this 
discrimination both when they were doing the same jobs as men and when they did 
different jobs using traditionally "female" skills. 
The trend to pay women less has been partly based on the assumption that men are 
"breadwinners" and women are the economic dependents of their male partners (Novitz, 
1987; Iverson, 1987). It is also an outcome of the systematic perception of "women's 
jobs" as less valuable, leading to a lower assessment of their economic worth and 
consequently lower pay. As Remick argues: 
Virtually all women's work suffers from the cultural perceptions that its main 
purpose is to help, not to do, and that there need to be men around to tell women 
what to do. These beliefs lead naturally to an assumption that women's work 
deserves litlle compensation (Remtck, 1984, p.97) 
Equal pay has been directed at paying women the same as men for doing the same 
jobs. On the other hand, pay equity aims at increasing the rates of pay for women and 
men in female dominated jobs which demand similar levels of skill, responsibility, effort 
and working conditions as higher paid jobs predominantly done by men. Comparison of 
occupations usually also involves attention to differences in pay which could be the 
outcome of differences in recruitment and retention of staff (Research Advisory Group, 
1990, pp.l37 -138; Employment Equity Act, 1990, p.29). 
New Zealand pay equity legislation involves the State making pay equity 
"assessments" using a job evaluation system to compare a "female" occupation with two 
"male" occupations 1 (Employment Equity Act, 1990, pp.20-31). Unions and employers 
can use the assessments when negotiating awards and agreements (Employment Equity 
Act, 1990, pp.31-32). There is provision for final offer arbitration through the 
Arbitration Commission if, after 60 days of making the claim, it has not been settled 
(Employment Equity Act, 1990, p.32). Contrary to the claims made in Penelope Brook's 
monograph and by the National Party, New Zealand's current pay equity legislation 
allows for consideration of supply and demand or "market" factors (Employment Equity 
Act, 1990, p. 29), and is to be achieved principally through union and employer 
negotiation, rather than wage fixing by the State as is the case in Australia. 
The arguments against pay equity rest on the view that in a "free" unregulated labour 
market there will be no discrimination on the basis of gender, age, race, religion or sexual 
orientation. "Supply and demand" and the "productivity" of workers will determine wage 
levels, not gender ideology (Brook, 1990, p.5). Accordingly, if women have been paid 
less it ts largely a function of supply and demand factors, their lower "productivity"2 their 
1 A ''female" job (in the New Zealand context) refers to an occupalion in which women arc 
60% or more of the workers. An equivalent definition is used to identify "male" 
occupations (Employment Equity Act, 1990, p.4). 
2 Productivity is a highly problematic concept. It may reflect the "productivity" of the 
employment organisation or the potential abilities of the worker, measured according to 
''human capital" factors such as education and years on the job. It is never clearly dcfmed 
by Brook and it is therefore difficult to assess her claims about women's lower 
"productivity". Advocates of comparable worth argue that the "productivity components 
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involvement in childrcaring and their lower educational and vocational qualifications 
(Brook, 1990, pp.6-9). 
Similarly, the discussion of income differentials between women and men draws 
heavily on "human capital" factors as explanatory variables (Polachek, 1984, pp.34-53). 
Married women's lower earnings are explained by their domestic commiunents which 
require them to be employed intermittently, part-time and/or enter less "demanding" jobs. 
Brook asserts that single women without these commiunents earn 91 percent of men's 
earnings. However, the source she cites provides no empiricaJ evidence to support this 
statistic) She further asserts that since employers (ideally) cannot afford to discriminate 
on the basis of factors not relevant to "productivity, inequalities in outcome for women 
and men in the labour market cannot be attributed to employer discrimination"(Brook, 
p.9). 
According to this analysis, if women have experienced discrimination, this is the 
outcome of government regulation and trade union action. It follows that women need 
less government regulation and less trade union interference in relations between women 
workers and employers. The alternative proposed is reliance on the "gender blind" 
features of pure free enterprise to deliver "fairness" in employment for women. These 
arguments are the ideas underpinning the directions in labour market policy being pursued 
by the National Government. As Brook herself stresses, debates about pay equity 
policies centre around whether the free market can provide the basis for "a fairer more 
prosperous society"(Brook, 1990, p.2), or whether government regulation is necessary to 
produce more equal outcomes. 
However, not all advocates of the free market oppose government regulation in 
response to historically based discrimination aga1nst women earners. Barbara Bergmann, 
an economist who considers that "prices and wages are best determined in a free, 
competitive market by supply and demand" (Bergmann, 1985, p.71), also argues that this 
market has not in the past always disp layed the "freedom of competition" that are 
supposed to be its ideal features. As a result, she concludes that nwage revisions designed 
to reduce the wage gap between the sexes are reasonable and desirable if they bring us 
closer to the more efficient and fairer structure that would be established by the free 
market itself in the absence of discrimination" (Bergmann, 1985, p.72). Recently she has 
elaborated on these views arguing that " ... the conventional arguments that economists 
bring to bear against comparable worth are based on overly simple tdeas about how the 
market works" (Bergmann, 1989, p.68). 
International evidence suggests that the "free market" is not inherently "fair" to 
women. The wage gap between women and men's earnings is highest in those countnes 
in which capitalist enterprise has most freedom to operate without government 
intervention. Since the United States is closer to the ideal of a free market and is 
characterised by less government intervention in the labour market, women ought to be 
beuer off there than in New Zealand. However, women in the USA earn 70 percent of 
men's median weekly earnings, while New Zealand women earn 77 percent of men's 
average weekly ordinary time earnings4· 
of the job should be separated from the comparison of jobs with respect to job content and 
working conditions. 
3 The 91 percent figure is derived from a journalistic account of pay equity issues in T. Sowell 
(1987). 
4 This comparison of ratios of male and female earnings involves comparing the differences 
in median weekly "usual" earnings in the United States in 1988 with differences in the 
average or mean earnings of women and men in New Zealand in the same year obtained 
through the Quarterly Employment Survey conducted by the Department of Labour in 1988. 
We are cautious about comparing ratios generated by comparison of medians and means. 
However, a difference as large as 7 percent between the USA and New Zealand cannot be 
attributed to differences in the types of statistical measures used. (US Department of the 
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Moreover, women's increased access to positions of responsibility in large 
organizations in the public and private sectors in the United States has occurred in 
response to affirmative action policies pursued by the Federal Government (Rosenbaum, 
1985). The obvious interpretation of this infonnation is that government intervention in 
the labour market leads to a reduction of the wage gap and improvements in women's 
access to occupations that were previously all male preserves. Women therefore need 
more rather than less state intervention in the labour market. 
State and union intervention in the past often did have discriminatory effects on 
women (Iverson, 1987). It is surprising that at a times when unions and the State 
become more committed to rectifying discrimination, employers and those who advocate 
their interests resist legislation which gives effect to a new set of more liberal sentiments 
with respect to women's access to earnings and employment opportunities. Besides, if 
capitalism and gender discrimination were indeed incompatible as neo-classical 
economists often argue, employers would have resisted the actions of the Arbitration 
Court in the 1920s and 1930s which set female minimum wages at a lower rate than 
those for men. They would also not object to legislation which requires them to do what 
Brooks suggests they would normally do anyway. 
Clearly, as Alice Kessler-Harris has suggested, the market tfis not independent of the 
values and customs of those who participate in it" (Kessler-Harris, 1988, p.239). Many 
wage theorists recognise that a variety of "exterior" factors determine wages as well as 
demand and supply factors (Dunlop, 1979, p.66). For some time there has also been 
recognition of the fact that workers use comparisons with other occupations to assess 
whether they are getting a "square deal" (Kessler-Harris, 1988. p.241). Pay equity 
assessments in the New Zealand context could enable women workers to get access to 
information about the gap between their earnings and those in other occupations which 
are similar with respect to levels of skill, effort, responsibility and working conditions. 
3. The empowerment of women through "freedom of 
contract"? 
Brook argues that a major source of inequitable treatment of workers is the Labour 
Relations Act 1987. She considers that it undennines the "freedom" of workers to 
negotiate their own contracts with employers and to choose the forms of worker 
association they prefer (Brook, 1990, pp.23-25). These arguments are also currently being 
made by the Minister of Labour who favours the "flexibility" of individual contracts of 
employment. 
The concerns raised by Brook about the way male trade unionists have focussed on 
the interests of male workers are not complemented by critical reflections on 
predominantly male employers. She exhibits a blind faith in the generosity of 
employers, who are portrayed as waiting to enter into individual contracts of work with 
women which wi ll accommodate many women's needs for f1exibility in hours of work 
and result in their increased access to male dominated occupations and positions of 
responsibility. In a high unemployment economy it is difficult to be convinced that 
most workers will be "empowered" by being able to enter into individual contracts with 
their employers. It is also difficult to believe that "freedom of contract" which entails 
voluntary unionism will, through competition in a free marketplace, "penalize 
exploitative or discriminatory treatment" (Brook, 1990, p.24). 
Commerce, Bureau of the Census, StaJistical Abstract of the United States, January 1990, 
p.409 and New Zealand Department of Labour, Quarterly Survey of EmployrnenJ, February 
to November, 1988. Surveys of employment are now conducted by the Department of 
S tati sties) . 
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Gregory et al. ask why the ratios of female to male earnings improved more rapidly 
in Australia and Britain than in the United States over the decade studied, despite the fact 
that the United States pionrered the introduction of equal pay legislation in 1963. They 
explore whether the differences can be explained by "human capital" factors such as the 
levels of qualifications of women in each of these countries. They find that the human 
capital model cannot explain these differences (Gregory et al., 1989, p.227) 
The explanation advanced by Gregory eta/. focuses on the institutional structures of 
the different societies. State regulation of wages and the existence of national agreements 
involving large unions which set rates of pay for a wide range of workers emerge as the 
source of differences in women's wages relative to those of men in the 3 countries. 
Discrimination against women in wage fixing in Australia and Britain had been more 
explicit than the United States prior to the passing of equal pay legislation. This 
legislation allowed some measure of assessment of equal pay for work of equal value or 
pay equity , but most importantly gave women in low paid jobs access to higher 
minimum rates of pay through the extension of male minimum rates to women (Gregory 
et al., 1989, p.230). 
In Australia and Britain there was an institutional structure which could be used to 
correct explicit discrimination against women with respect to earning when state policy 
changed. In the USA, however, there have been no comparable large scale institutions to 
correct discrimination in wages between women and men, despite the passing of the Equal 
Pay Act in 1963, about a decade before the introduction of similar legislation in Australia 
and Britain. Outcomes depend much more crucially on the dynamics of the market, 
which result in a larger wage gap between the earnings for women and men in the USA 
(Gregory et al., 1989, pp.229-237). 
Gregory et al. further argue that the success of strategies in Australia and Britain for 
improving women's pay relative to men rested on mechanisms for ensuring that each pay 
agreement included a common minimum rate for women and men that extended across 
fmns (Gregory et a/., 1989, pp.233). This evidence therefore contradicts the claim that 
the best context for improvement in women's earnings is the free operation of the market 
with minimal involvement by the State in wage fixing. In the absence of state 
initiatives to encourage equal pay and pay equity and a well developed structure for union 
negotiation of rates of pay, women earn far lower wages than men. 
6 . Employment loss as a consequence of moves to improve the 
ratios of women and men's earnings 
Gregory et al. also address the issue of potential employment loss which Brooks assumes 
will be an outcome of the pursuit of pay equity. They conclude that, while the rate of 
women's involvement in employment was highest in the USA, it rose by much the same 
amount in each of the countries studied (by 25 percent in Australia, by 27 percent in 
Britain and by 31 percent in the USA). Their conclusion is that improvements in 
women's wages relative to those of men in Australia had only a slight negative impact on 
the demand for women workers in that country. They suggest that: " ... the impact of the 
large changes in pay relativities on female demand and supply must have been 
marginal"(Gregory et al., 1989, p.237). Australian women were most advantaged by 
strategies directed at improving the ratio of female to male wages, and yet there was no 
evidence that they were seriously disadvantaged after the equal pay judgements. 
This suggests that there are grounds for questioning Penelope Brook's assertion that 
the introduction of pay equity in the New Zealand context will have disemployment 
effects. At the same time, it is important to note that the best climate for movements 
towards comparable worth is low rather than high unemployment (Hartmann, 1987, 
p.257) . We need to think about how we can provide a climate conducive to the 
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achievement of employment equity, rather than postponing its achievement because the 
conditions are not ideal. 
7. Job evaluation and comparable worth/pay equity 
Opponents of pay equity naively charge that the pursuit of comparable worth implies 
that women should be paid for the "intrinsic worth, of the jobs they do (Brook, 1990, 
p.lO). However, comparable worth or pay equity advocates argue that jobs should be 
rewarded, not on an assessment of their intrinsic value or their utility in the community, 
but on the basis of comparative analysis drawing on similarities and differences between 
occupations. Their interest is in job evaluation systems which tell us about "how 
employers set pay, and ... how such evaluation can be used as a benchmark against which 
to judge whether comparable men's and women's jobs are treated differently" (England and 
Dunn, 1988, p.229). 
Brook acknowledges that job evaluation schemes have been used by employers for 
years to arrive at a system of pay rates for those they employ. Job evaluation done to 
"enhance their [employers'] ability to put prices on jobs" is part of efficient management, 
but job evaluation schemes associated with pay equity moves are seen as "subjective" and 
suspect since they disrupt the free operation of market forces (Brook, 1990, p.l3). She 
cites the way different schemes yield different rankings of occupations while claiming to 
be "gender neutral" assessment systems6. 
~1uch critical attention has been directed at processes of job evaluation (Treiman, 
1979; Beatty and Beatty, 1984; Burton et al., 1987; Schwab, 1989; Greig et a/.,1989). 
Since job evaluauon schemes arc used by many employers to determine the rates they arc 
prepared to offer for certain jobs, it is crucial that they be subjected to scrutiny, 
irrespective of their usc in pay equity claims. It is difficult to understand why Brook, 
among other neo-classical cconomisL~, considers them relatively unproblematic as devices 
for employers to set wages, and so disruptive if used to advance women's arguments for 
higher rates of pay. 
Critics of comparable worth or pay equity often argue that the strategy for comparing 
"male II and "female" jobs involves comparing "apples and pears~~. As a matter of fact, the 
practice of such procedures is an inherent aspect of job evaluation systems whatever their 
purpose. Most job evaluation systems involve comparing different jobs by establishing 
common factors which arc weighted in accordance with their relative contribution to the 
job. This entails summing the aggregate score or "point value" for each job. This 
practice has been widely used in both public and private sectors in the United States and 
New Zealand. 
A key issue is the wcightings given to the factors which arc considered in the job 
evaluation. Close examination of job evaJuation schemes reveals persistent elements of 
gender discrimination. For example, the wcightings of factors that are mostly associated 
with women's skills, such as personal/human relations, servicing and caring have 
invariably been underestimated, and therefore underpaid (Tricman and Hartmann, 1981; 
Trciman, 1984; Hyman, 1987; Steinberg and Haignere, 1987). 
6 The methods utilised in job evaluation systems cover a considerable range of measurements 
that are likely to inOuence the process of determining the relative value of jobs, and thus 
decisions about payments (Livy, 1975). Accordingly, the application of different 
measurements would provide different assessments of job worth for the same occupations 
in various organisations. In the context of comparable worth, the use of job evaluation 
schemes focuses on quantitative measurements based on an ~nalytic (a priori) approach. 
This involves the application of a single point factor system across all job families or 
classes and preferably a single pay policy line. (For detailed discussion of the technical 
details involved, sec Remick, 1984, p.99 and Steinberg and Haigere, 1987. p.159). 
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It is sufficient to indicate here that because the choice of factors and their weightings 
inevitably involve human judgements, the problem of subjectivity is inherent in job 
evaluation, or any other types of evaluation for that matter. Hence, the probability of 
developing an objective bias-free job evaluation scheme may not be fully realised. But 
what comparable worth strategy attempts to achieve is the development of guidelines that 
reduce gender discrimination and which in effect can "serve as a reminder that bias should 
be eliminated whenever possible" (Remick, 1984, p.IOO) 
Feminist analysis of job evaluation schemes has often focussed on how they can be 
used to perpetuate and legitimate differences in the earnings of those in male dominated 
and female dominated occupations (Hyman, 1986: Burton, 1987; Mount and Ellis, 1989). 
However, despite the tendency for most job evaluation schemes to favour jobs in which 
men are the majority, the application of schemes like the Hay system of job evaluation 
has revealed significant differences in the pay of those in occupations which have very 
similar points scores (Evans and Nelson, 1989, pp.175-177). Scattergrams of the 
relationship between salary and scores on the Hay job evaluation point system indicate 
that there are distinct pay lines for male and female dominated jobs - male dominated jobs 
tend to cluster around one line through the graph and female dominated jobs around 
another, even when these jobs score the same number of points. 
The highly technical nature of job evaluation entails considerable reliance on experts 
and the need for workers, trade unionists and employers to absorb a lot of information in 
order to demystify the expertise of the technicians. Job evaluation schemes may expose 
gender inequality in earnings of those doing comparable work, but they are also a 
technocratic device for legitimating differences in earnings between occupational groups 
(Evans and Nelson, 1989, pp.176-180). These job evaluation schemes can be used to 
justify inequality of remuneration between women workers with differing levels of formal 
skill and training. In the New Zealand context, they could be used to legitimise the 
differential earnings of women with formal training and those with limited educational 
and vocational qualifications. Maori women and Pacific Island women are overrepresented 
among those without formal qualifications. Job evaluations schemes have the potential 
therefore to justify inequalities in outcome between women in different ethnic groups. 
Critical reflection on job evaluation as a component of pay equity policies is 
therefore VItal, but it should be pursued in order to reveal the limitations of pay equity as 
a strategy for equality for women, not to undermine its potential to deliver improvements 
in earnings for a range of women who occupy different positions in a hierarchically 
organised paid workforce. As we indicate below, empirical evaluation of the 
implementation of pay equity strategies reveal that they can deliver increases in pay for 
women with minimal formal qualifications in the lowest paid forms of work. 
8. The impact of comparable worth/pay equity policies on low 
paid women workers: evidence from the United States 
Information from the United States suggests that the implementation of comparable 
worth or pay equity strategies for state employees and those employed by local authorities 
has not solely benefited women with educational and vocational qualifications at the 
expense of women who are most vulnerable in the labour market. The Washington State 
pay equity study revealed that women laundry workers and telephone operators have 
benefited from comparable worth claims, as well as nurses, clerical workers, and 
physiotherapists (Rcmick,1984, p. 106). 
Studies of the implementation of state-imposed comparable worth legislation in 
Minnesota indicate that there have been no job losses there due to comparable worth 
initiatives for state employees and those employed by 22 localities in that state - 4 
counties, 10 cities, and 8 school districts (Evans and Nelson, 1989, p.183). At the same 
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time there arc pressures to reduce the size of work forces in these localities which arc part 
of nationwide pressures associated with fiscal constraint. There are some fears that 
localities having to meet the costs of higher wages for women workers will cut back on 
policy initiatives like programmes for "latch key children" (Evans and Nelson, 1989, 
pp.l83-84 ). 
Evans and Nelson's study of the Minnesota comparable worth initiatives concluded 
that pay equity can put money into "the hands and pockets of women and minorities who 
are at the lowest end of the pay scale"not just those women with high level qualifications 
(Evans and Nelson, 1989, pp.185-86). They look at improvements in the base pay for an 
entry level Clerk 1 which had risen $2,246 as a result of comparable worth raises in the 
period 1984-1987. 
They argue that comparable worth should be seen as a long term strategy which has 
both good and "troublesome" consequences (Evans and Nelson, 1990,p.187). In the light 
of these findings it appears that Penelope Brook's discussion of pay equity/comparable 
worth exaggerates the possible negative outcomes, while neglecting to consider the 
positive consequences. 
9. Pay equity as one strategy for the end to discrimination 
against women 
Penelope Brook tends to imply that advocates of pay equity think that it is the only 
solution to all labour market inequalities between women and men. The strategy in her 
monograph is to set up pay equity as a potential solution to a range of problems that it 
was not intended to address~ she then demonstrates that it is not a viable strategy because 
it cannot solve those problems. Most of those who argue for pay equity or comparable 
worth consider that it is useful as one means of addressing discrimination against women 
in paid work. As Robert Michael and Heidi Hartmann have recently indicated: 
... comparable worth is not designed to cure all possible labour market 
discrimination against women. It is a prescription for a specific illness that 
has to do with certain jobs being undervalued. In par!icular, if jobs held 
disproportionately by women are undervalued according to sorne objectively 
held criteria partly because they are held disproportionately by women, then 
comparable worth is a medication a wise doctor would consider prescribing. If 
instead a different illness exists, one that is related to limited access to jobs or 
limited opportunity for advancement by women, or to lower pay to women for 
the same work ... then other medication such as equal employment opportunity 
legislation. remedial affirmative action or traditional equal pay remedies, would 
be more appropriate (Michael and Hartmann, 1989, p.2) 
The recognition in New Zealand that a variety of different strategies are needed to 
address inequalities between women and men in paid work is reflected in the current 
Employment Equity Act which does address the issue of the need for both pay equity and 
equal employment opportunity. It focuses attention on the processes which produce 
unequal outcomes for women and requires large employing organizations to identify those 
processes and devise strategies to change them in the interests of women's access to the 
full range of jobs and positions of responsibility in their workplaces. A recent report 
from the National Advisory Council on the Employment of Women also stresses the 
need for a variety of strategies to improve women's access to paid work, to a wider range 
of jobs and to better rates of pay. It concludes that: 
' A complex set of factors influences women's access to jobs. the sort of work 
they do, their opportunities for career advancement and their rates of pay. An 
adequate response to that complexily by those interested in ending inequalities 
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between women and men and between Pakeh~ Maori and Pacific Island women 
is a varied set of strategies which range form monetary policy to the detail of 
childcare funding and the forms of job evaluation to be used in pay equity 
assessments" (Research Advisory Group, 1990, p. l76). 
This argument that pay equity must be seen as just one of a number of strategies 
necessary to achieve equality for women in the labour market is echoed in the work of 
Evans and Nelson who have extensively studied the implementation of comparable worth 
in the state of Minnesota. They argue that comparable worth "is neither a single utopian 
answer to wage inequity, nor is it dismissable because it does not do everything." (Evans 
and Nelson, 1989, p.178). 
It is important that those who want to defend pay equity not exaggerate the extent to 
which it can deliver employment equity for women. At the same time it is vital that 
there be informed debate about the ways in which it has the potential to rectify 
historically based inequalities in pay between occupations in which women predominate 
and those in which men are a majority. This potential is best realised in a context of 
economic policy aimed at reducing unemployment, the pursuit of equal employment 
opportunity in all workplaces, improvements in women's access to childcare and 
educational strategies directed at extending the range of occupations in which women arc 
represented. We consider that state intervention in the labour market and strong union 
organizations arc necessary if these conditions for employment equity for women are to 
be realised in the 1990s. 
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